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The corporate governance implications for China 
 
Adam Karbowski1 
 
Summary 
The following paper applies agency theory to China’s current economic reform program. The 
financial and regulatory structures necessary for an efficient corporate governance system in 
China are discussed. The analysis is focused on the Chinese state – owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and township and village enterprises (TVEs). The first section of the paper seeks to review the 
essence of the principal – agent problem. The second section explains the ‘success story’ of 
the Chinese TVEs. The final part of the paper assesses the efficiency of SOE corporate 
governance mechanisms in China. 
 
The principal – agent theory 
 
 The ‘principal – agent problem’ term was coined by Stephen Ross in 1973 to refer to the 
general problem of creating a contract to ensure that the agent pursues the principal’s goals as 
efficiently as possible (Ross, 1973; Alexander, 2006). In a principal – agent relationship a 
principal delegates some rights to an agent who acts on behalf of the principal in return for a 
payment. The principal – agent problem arises from two sources: (1) imperfect information 
and (2) misaligned incentives between the principal and agent (Alexander, 2006). 
 The principal – agent problem can be alleviated by the employment of an efficient 
corporate governance mechanism. According to Zhang (2006) corporate governance 
mechanism governs relationships between different factor-owners of the firm, in particular, 
between capitalists and managers through allocation of residual claim and control rights by 
contracts. 
 Efficient corporate governance implies the following rules: 
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• the matching between residual claim and control rights to the highest possible extent2 
(Knight, 1921), 
• managerial remuneration should be closely linked to performance of the firm (Zhang, 
2006), 
• the authority of selecting and monitoring management should be assigned to capitalists 
(Zhang, 1994), 
• concentration of ownership with large investors is preferred (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
Today’s China in the post-Mao reform era struggles to employ an efficient corporate 
governance system. The picture of current economic reforms is however ambiguous. Whereas 
rural enterprises prosper, state – owned industrial enterprises (SOIEs) in the urban areas bear 
losses (Zhang, 2006). 
The key explanation of this phenomenon can be understood under the principal – agent 
framework. Only the Chinese township and village enterprises (TVEs) managed to alleviate 
the agency problem to the considerable extent. SOEs have failed to solve the long-term 
managerial incentive problem and the management selection problem (Zhang, 2006). The 
detailed justification of the above thesis will follow. 
 
Corporate governance in rural China 
 
The importance of the township and village enterprises to the Chinese economy is 
steadily rising. The share of the TVEs in the gross industrial output value of the country rose 
from 16,3 per cent in 1984 to almost 56 per cent in the nineties (Kwong and Lee, 2000). 
Annual per capita net household income in rural China rose from 133 yuan in the late 
seventies to 1926 yuan in 1995 (Kwong and Lee, 2000). When we compare the growth rates 
of output (Y), capital (K), labor (L) and total factor productivity (TFP) of the TVEs and SOEs 
from 1979 to 1991, it becomes evident that these indices are much higher in rural areas than 
in urbanized China (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Differences in productivity between the Chinese SOEs and TVEs (1979-1991). 
 SOEs    TVEs    
Factor Y K L TFP Y K L TFP 
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Growth 
rate 
8,4 7,8 3,0 4,0 25,3 16,5 11,9 12,0 
Source: M. Weitzman, C. Xu, “Chinese township-village enterprises as vaguely defined cooperatives”, Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 18, 121-145. 
 
One of the explanations of the success of the Chinese TVEs is derived from the 
principal – agent theory (Kwong and Lee, 2000). The township and village enterprise 
formally is owned to the local community (the principal) which is acted on behalf of by the 
township – village government (TVG). In practice, the local community is unable to 
effectively motivate the TVG. However, the motivational pressure comes from the very top of 
the Chinese political hierarchy, i.e. higher-level governments (county, province and central 
governments). 
The primary goal of the Chinese central government is to keep stable flows of fiscal 
revenue from the local areas. The prerequisite for high revenues from taxation is to facilitate 
economic growth in the localities. The motivational pressure directed at the TVG comes then 
from the top of the Chinese political hierarchy instead of from the bottom (local 
communities). 
The central government in order to enforce efficiency at the local level has developed 
the fiscal contract system. The system requires the local governments to submit a portion of 
local fiscal revenue to the higher-level governments. These fiscal duties motivate the TVGs to 
offer support and assistance to the TVEs. The local governments provide then technological 
backup and expertise3, assist the TVEs to secure bank loans, grant various tax concessions for 
the TVEs. 
Within TVEs, there is another type of principal – agent relationship, i.e. between the 
TVE managers (principal) and the employees (agents). The managers face two objectives: 
• they have to fulfill the financial targets set by the supervising TVGs, 
• they strive to maximize their own welfare through the positions they hold in the 
Chinese economy. 
The employees, on the other hand, pursue their own wage maximization and enhancement of 
the communal welfare. 
The system of incentives directed at workers is successfully injected into a reward 
scheme. According to Dong (1998) the employment and reward of the employees are directly 
related to the financial conditions of the TVEs. It means that the TVEs work as real market 
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and performance based enterprises. Dong (1998) used a panel data of 10 provinces with 200 
TVEs from 1984 to 1990 to look into the correlation between financial conditions of the 
enterprises and the employment and rewards of the employees. It turned out that the wages 
are responsive to the dominant market salary pattern and the financial standing of the 
enterprise. 
Due to the fact that the profitability of the enterprise determines the size of 
employment and the benefits of the workers, there is motivation on the part of the employees 
to work hard. What is more, some portion of the after – tax profits of the TVE is to be used to 
enhance the communal welfare. This creates an indirect incentive for the staff to work hard in 
order to contribute to the local area development. 
As we see the TVEs in China work efficiently and respond to many market 
mechanisms. This result at first glance seems to be a real economic puzzle. Under a collective 
ownership with unclear delineation of property rights productivity of the firm should be 
adversely affected. However, in case of township and village enterprises we observe just the 
opposite. The TVEs are developing fast and play more and more important role in the Chinese 
economy. 
This puzzle can be solved under the principal – agent theory. Although only one4 of 
the four conditions for an efficient corporate governance system (compare Page 1) is here 
fulfilled, the principal – agent problem is successfully alleviated by: 
• overlapping interests of the various principals (local communities, central government, 
TVE managers) and agents (TVGs, TVE employees), 
• linking the benefits of parties involved with the profits of the enterprises. 
In a nutshell, the proper design of the business – government relations in rural China 
gave birth to the efficient corporate governance mechanism in the TVEs and contributed to 
the overall growth of the Chinese economy. 
 
Corporate governance in the Chinese SOEs 
 
Before we discuss the Chinese corporate governance mechanisms in SOEs, let me 
briefly point out the prevailing features of the state owned governance. Under this 
mechanism, assets are owned by the state and controlled by the special ministry (Ewing, 
2005). The ministry appoints members of the Board of Directors and usually selects the 
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management team. Managers exercise control over the company’s assets, however the 
ministries keep an authority over the investment decisions. SOEs raise capital in state banks, 
though state banks determine the level and condition of enterprise financing. 
Look that there are two important differences between free market and state owned 
governance. First, the ministry has authority over assets that actually are not owned by the 
ministry. Second, the management team purses the goals of the ministry, not shareholders. 
These two characteristics constitute possible efficiency losses and create a breeding ground 
for the agency problem. 
Today’s China struggles to transition between state owned and free market governance 
modes. As we shall see this transitory route is not the easiest one. The reform of corporate 
governance system in the Chinese SOEs is on the political agenda since 1984 (Zhang, 2006). 
Although the reform is still in progress, the economists assess its current fruits. According to 
Zhang (2006) the assessments are almost two-point distributed among experts. Some 
economists (mostly foreign) believe that the reform has been truly successful. They underline 
steady improvement in productivity of the Chinese SOEs (3 per cent at annual rate on 
average) since the late seventies. 
Chinese economists are much more skeptical. They stress that only one third of all 
SOEs make profits (the rest bear losses). Chinese economists believe that the problem of 
SOEs is mainly that of the principal rather than that of agents (Zhang, 2006). In the pre-
reform era (before 1979) the residual claim and control rights were in practice held by the 
bureaucrats. Therefore the Chinese SOE reform was primarily focused on the transfer of 
decision rights and residual claim from the bureaucrats to the firm level. Firm-level decisions 
are believed to be much more efficient than those made at the government level mainly 
because of better access to information. 
According to Zhang (2006) the current landscape of corporate governance reform in 
China is as follows: 
• the short – term incentive problem in the SOEs is already solved, 
• the long – term incentive problem and management selection problem of the SOEs are 
still to be solved. However, this requires a rudimentary change of ownership in the 
Chinese economy. 
Short term managerial incentives arose due to implementation of the management 
contract system (MCS). These contracts are negotiated by the state-owned enterprise and the 
group of governmental agencies. Usually the contracts are valid for 3 or 4 years (they are 
short run oriented). The typical management contract specifies: (1) indicators of profit and tax 
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target, (2) utilization of retained profits, (3) debt repayments, (4) asset appreciation, (5) 
planned technology innovation and (6) planned product quality improvements. Some 
contracts include output target, production costs’ target and, in special cases, fulfillment of the 
state plan (Zhang, 2006). 
Under the MCS there are two kinds of incentives for management. Whereas the first 
incentive is formal and explicit, the second remains informal and implicit. First of all, 
managers thanks to the signed contract can legally claim part of the residual. Secondly, by 
having granted autonomy over business decisions, managers become natural holders of some 
control rights. As we remember the matching between residual claim and control rights is the 
first condition for an efficient corporate governance to function (Knight, 1921; Groves et al., 
1994). The informal and implicit incentive (Zhang, 2006) exists because managers by 
manipulating accounts and stripping assets can claim more residual than specified in the 
contract. 
Despite the fact that the MCS has considerably improved the managers’ incentives to 
work harder and to make short term profits, the long term motivation has still to be enforced. 
Some studies (Huang et al., 1998) show that SOE managers prefer to distribute retained 
profits to employees or invest in projects which generate ‘quick money’ rather than invest in 
long term R&D projects. Asset stripping also boosts current profits, but may put future firm’s 
productivity in serious danger. 
The next reason for the managerial myopia is the prevailing uncertainty about the 
employment. Mangers simply do not know whether they will still hold the position in the next 
year. Their employment depends on shaky preferences of politicians rather than the 
performance of the SOE. Here we encounter the second problem which has to be solved, 
namely, the management selection procedure. 
SOE managers are appointed by government representatives rather than capitalists. 
This violates the third condition for the efficient corporate governance to function. The 
current appointment system induces the SOE managers to attain average profits. This is 
because once a firm becomes profitable, bureaucrats immediately replace the incumbent 
manager with their favorite. That is why, the best strategy for the manager to keep her/his 
position is to make the SOE not too good and not too bad. 
To ensure that the proper people (professional managers) will lead the enterprises, the 
authority to select and appoint candidates should be transferred from bureaucrats to 
capitalists. In fact, this means further privatization of the Chinese SOEs. 
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According to Zhang (2006) the privatization process has been speeded up after the 15th 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Well – prepared privatization program may 
successfully alleviate the discussed agency problems in the Chinese enterprises and bring 
about new efficient corporate governance modes. 
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